

APPEAL NO. 041690
FILED SEPTEMBER 1, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on June 28, 2004. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issue by deciding that the respondent's (claimant) compensable _____, injury extends to and includes lymphedema and chronic venous stasis of his right leg. The appellant (carrier) appealed, arguing that the overwhelming weight of the evidence is contrary to the decision and order. The claimant responded, urging affirmance.

DECISION

Affirmed.

The parties stipulated that on _____, the claimant sustained a compensable right knee and lower leg injury while in the course and scope of his employment. At issue was whether the claimant's compensable injury extends to include lymphedema and chronic venous stasis of the right leg.

Extent of injury is a question of fact. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Conflicting evidence was presented on the disputed issue. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Company v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying the standard of review outlined above, we find no reversible error.

We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CT CORPORATION SYSTEMS
350 NORTH ST. PAUL
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.**

Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Judy L. S. Barnes
Appeals Judge

Robert W. Potts
Appeals Judge