

APPEAL NO. 041578  
FILED AUGUST 23, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on June 4, 2004. The hearing officer decided that the appellant/cross-respondent (claimant herein) did sustain a compensable injury on \_\_\_\_\_, and that the claimant had disability for the period beginning on August 10 and continuing through September 17, 2001. The claimant files a request for review in which he argues that the second determination concerning the period of disability was contrary to the evidence. The claimant also complains that the hearing officer states in his narrative that the claimant suffered a lumbar sprain/strain. The respondent/cross-appellant (carrier herein) also filed a request for review arguing that the determinations were contrary to the evidence. In addition, the carrier filed a response to the claimant's request for review, urging affirmance.

DECISION

Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

We have held that the questions of injury and disability are questions of fact for the hearing officer. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence, we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).

In the present case, there was simply conflicting evidence on the issues of extent of injury and disability, and it was the province of the hearing officer to resolve these

conflicts. In determining the period of disability, the hearing officer necessarily considered all the evidence regarding the injury. In making his statement that the claimant had suffered a lumbar sprain/strain, the hearing officer was not making a finding limiting the extent of the injury. He was evaluating the issue of whether disability extended beyond September 17, 2001. Applying the above standard of review, we find that the hearing officer's decision was sufficiently supported by the evidence in the record.

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CT CORPORATION  
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET  
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.**

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Gary L. Kilgore  
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

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Daniel R. Barry  
Appeals Judge

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Elaine Chaney  
Appeals Judge