

APPEAL NO. 041299  
FILED JULY 15, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on April 27, 2004. With respect to the issues before her, the hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury on \_\_\_\_\_, and that he did not have disability because he did not sustain a compensable injury. In his appeal, the claimant argues that those determinations are against the great weight of the evidence. In its response to the claimant's appeal, the respondent (carrier) urges affirmance.

DECISION

Affirmed.

The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury on \_\_\_\_\_. The claimant had the burden of proof on that issue. Johnson v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 351 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ). The injury issue presented a question of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence and of its weight and credibility. Section 410.165(a). The hearing officer resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and decides what facts the evidence has established. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n. v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision we will reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986).

In this instance, the hearing officer determined that the evidence did not establish that the claimant sustained a compensable injury. She found that the claimant simply was not persuasive in his testimony that he lacerated his toe at work on \_\_\_\_\_, which later developed an infection and necessitated the amputation of all of the toes of the claimant's left foot. The hearing officer was acting within her province as the fact finder in so finding. Nothing in our review of the record demonstrates that the challenged determination is so against the great weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust; therefore, no sound basis exists for us to reverse the injury determination on appeal. Pool, *supra*; Cain, *supra*.

The 1989 Act requires the existence of a compensable injury as a prerequisite to a finding of disability. Section 401.011(16). Because we have affirmed the hearing officer's determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury, we likewise affirm the determination that he did not have disability.

The hearing officer's decision and order are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CT CORPORATION SYSTEMS  
350 NORTH ST. PAUL, SUITE 2900  
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.**

---

Elaine M. Chaney  
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

---

Margaret L. Turner  
Appeals Judge

---

Edward Vilano  
Appeals Judge