

APPEAL NO. 040653  
FILED MAY 13, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on March 2, 2004. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issue by determining that the appellant's (claimant) impairment rating (IR) is 10%, in accordance with the opinion of the designated doctor appointed by the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission). The claimant appeals this determination. The appeal file contains no response from the respondent (self-insured).

DECISION

Affirmed.

Section 408.125(e) provides that for an injury that occurred prior to June 17, 2001, where there is a dispute as to the correct IR, the report of the Commission-selected designated doctor is entitled to presumptive weight unless it is contrary to the great weight of the other medical evidence. Tex. W.C. Comm'n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 130.6(i) (Rule 130.6(i)) provides that the designated doctor's response to a request for clarification is also considered to have presumptive weight, as it is part of the designated doctor's opinion. See *also*, Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 013042-s, decided January 17, 2002. We have previously discussed the meaning of "the great weight of the other medical evidence" in numerous cases. We have held that it is not just equally balancing the evidence or a preponderance of the evidence that can overcome the presumptive weight given to the designated doctor's report. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92412, decided September 28, 1992. We have also held that no other doctor's report, including the report of the treating doctor, is accorded the special, presumptive status accorded to the report of the designated doctor. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92366, decided September 10, 1992; Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93825, decided October 15, 1993.

Whether the great weight of the other medical evidence was contrary to the amended report of the designated doctor was a factual question for the hearing officer to resolve. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). Nothing in our review of the record indicates that the hearing officer's decision is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Accordingly, no sound basis exists for us to

disturb the hearing officer's IR determination on appeal. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **(a self-insured governmental entity)** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**MB  
(ADDRESS)  
(CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).**

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Chris Cowan  
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

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Veronica L. Ruberto  
Appeals Judge

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Margaret L. Turner  
Appeals Judge