

APPEAL NO. 040493
FILED APRIL 22, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on February 9, 2004. The hearing officer determined that the respondent (claimant herein) sustained a compensable repetitive trauma injury with a date of injury of _____, and that the claimant had disability on June 23, 2003, and for the period beginning on June 30, 2003, and continuing through the date of the CCH. The appellant (carrier herein) files a request for review, contending that the hearing officer's decision is contrary to the evidence. The claimant replies that the evidence supports the hearing officer's decision.

DECISION

Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The issues of injury, date of injury, and disability are questions of fact for the hearing officer. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).

In the present case, there was simply conflicting evidence regarding the disputed issues, and it was the province of the hearing officer to resolve these conflicts. Applying the above standard of review, we find that the hearing officer's decision was sufficiently supported by the evidence in the record.

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.**

Gary L. Kilgore
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Judy L. S. Barnes
Appeals Judge

Daniel R. Barry
Appeals Judge