

APPEAL NO. 040350  
FILED MARCH 31, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on January 23, 2004. With respect to the issues before him, the hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease with a date of \_\_\_\_\_; that she did not timely report her alleged injury to her employer; and that she did not have disability. In her appeal, the claimant essentially argues that those determinations are against the great weight of the evidence. In its response to the claimant's appeal, the respondent (carrier) urges affirmance.

DECISION

Affirmed.

The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant did not sustain a compensable repetitive trauma injury with a date of \_\_\_\_\_, and that she did not timely report her alleged injury to her employer. The claimant had the burden of proof on those issues and they presented questions of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. Johnson v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 351 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ). The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence and of its weight and credibility. Section 410.165(a). The hearing officer resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and decides what facts the evidence has established. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). In this instance, the hearing officer simply was not persuaded by the claimant's testimony and evidence that the claimant sustained a repetitive trauma injury as a credit and activation representative for a wireless company or that she reported her alleged injury to her employer within the 30-day period provided for doing so. The hearing officer was acting within his province as the fact finder in so finding. Nothing in our review of the record demonstrates that the hearing officer's injury and notice determinations are so against the great weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust; therefore, no sound basis exists for us to reverse those determinations on appeal. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986).

The 1989 Act requires the existence of a compensable injury as a prerequisite to a finding of disability. Section 401.011(16). Because we have affirmed the hearing officer's determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury, we likewise affirm the determination that she did not have disability.

The hearing officer's decision and order are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**ROBIN M. MOUNTAIN  
6600 CAMPUS CIRCLE DRIVE EAST, SUITE 300  
IRVING, TEXAS 75063.**

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Elaine M. Chaney  
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

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Judy L. S. Barnes  
Appeals Judge

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Edward Vilano  
Appeals Judge