

APPEAL NO. 040268
FILED MARCH 29, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on January 6, 2004. The hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant herein) reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) on March 6, 2003, and had a zero percent impairment rating (IR) based upon the report of a designated doctor selected by the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission). The claimant appeals, contending that the MMI/IR certification by the designated doctor is incorrect because two neurosurgeons have stated that he needs spinal surgery. There is no response from the respondent (carrier herein) to the claimant's request for review in the appeal file.

DECISION

Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

Section 408.122(c) provides that the report of the designated doctor has presumptive weight, and the Commission shall base its determination of whether the claimant has reached MMI on the report unless the great weight of the other medical evidence is to the contrary. Section 408.125(c) provides that for injuries with dates of injury on or after June 17, 2001,¹ the report of a designated doctor shall have presumptive weight and the Commission shall base the IR on that report unless the great weight of the other medical evidence is to the contrary, and that, if the great weight of the medical evidence contradicts the IR contained in the report of the designated doctor chosen by the Commission, the Commission shall adopt the IR of one of the other doctors. We have previously discussed the meaning of "the great weight of the other medical evidence" in numerous cases. We have held that it is not just equally balancing the evidence or a preponderance of the evidence that can overcome the presumptive weight given to the designated doctor's report. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92412, decided September 28, 1992. We have also held that no other doctor's report, including the report of the treating doctor, is accorded the special, presumptive status accorded to the report of the designated doctor. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92366, decided September 10, 1992; Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93825, decided October 15, 1993.

Whether the great weight of the other medical evidence was contrary to the opinion of the designated doctor is basically a factual determination. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93459, decided July 15, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the

¹ The claimant's date of injury in the present case is _____.

relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying this standard we find no error in the hearing officer's finding that the great weight of the medical evidence was not contrary to the report of the designated doctor and in basing his determination of MMI and IR on the report of the designated doctor. This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.**

Gary L. Kilgore
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Elaine M. Chaney
Appeals Judge

Edward Vilano
Appeals Judge