

APPEAL NO. 040257
FILED MARCH 22, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on January 9, 2004, with the record closing on January 15, 2004. The hearing officer determined that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable repetitive trauma injury with a date of injury of _____, and that she had disability from June 6, 2003, continuing through the date of the CCH. The appellant (carrier) files a request for review, contending that the decision of the hearing officer is not supported by the evidence. The claimant responds and requests that we affirm the decision of the hearing officer.

DECISION

Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The issue of whether or not the claimant sustained an injury is a question of fact. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).

In the present case, there was simply conflicting evidence, and it was the province of the hearing officer to resolve these conflicts. Applying the above standard of review, we find that the hearing officer's finding of injury was sufficiently supported by the evidence in the record.

Disability is also a question of fact. Disability can be established by a claimant's testimony alone, even if contradictory of medical testimony. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92285, decided August 14, 1992; Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92167, decided June 11, 1992. There was conflicting evidence regarding disability and it was the province of the hearing officer to resolve these conflicts. We perceive no legal error in the hearing officer's resolution of the disability issue.

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **AMERICAN PROTECTION INSURANCE COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS, COMMODORE 1, SUITE 750
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.**

Gary L. Kilgore
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Chris Cowan
Appeals Judge

Thomas A. Knapp
Appeals Judge