

APPEAL NO. 033329
FILED FEBRUARY 12, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on December 3, 2003. The hearing officer determined that the compensable injury of _____, does not extend to or include an injury to the lumbar spine, specifically disc herniation at L4-5. The appellant (claimant) appeals, asserting that the injury at L4-5 is a direct result of the original injury to L5-S1, and the surgery he had at L5-S1. The respondent (carrier) responds, urging affirmance.

DECISION

Affirmed.

In deciding whether the hearing officer's decision is sufficiently supported by the evidence, we will only consider the evidence admitted at the hearing. We will not generally consider evidence that was not submitted into the record and raised for the first time on appeal. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92255, decided July 27, 1992. To determine whether evidence offered for the first time on appeal requires that the case be remanded for further consideration, we consider whether it came to the appellant's knowledge after the hearing, whether it is cumulative, whether it was through lack of diligence that it was not offered at the hearing, and whether it is so material that it would probably produce a different result. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93111, decided March 29, 1993; Black v. Wills, 758 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ). We do not find that to be the case with the 28 pages of information, apparently downloaded from the internet, which the claimant attached to his request for review and, consequently, we will not consider that information on appeal.

We have held that the question of the extent of an injury is a question of fact for the hearing officer. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision

only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).

In the present case, the hearing officer was not persuaded that there was a causal connection between the claimant's compensable injury and any current condition he may have at the L4-5 disc. It was the province of the hearing officer to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. Applying our standard of review, we find that the hearing officer's decision was sufficiently supported by the evidence in the record.

We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CT CORPORATION
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.**

Michael B. McShane
Appeals Panel
Manager/Judge

CONCUR:

Elaine M. Chaney
Appeals Judge

Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge