

APPEAL NO. 033224
FILED FEBRUARY 5, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on November 12, 2003. The hearing officer decided that the compensable injury sustained by the appellant (claimant herein) on _____, does not include the bulging and herniated disc in the claimant's cervical spine, and that the claimant's impairment rating (IR) is 14%. The claimant appeals, contending that the decision of the hearing officer is contrary to the evidence. There is no response to the claimant's request for review from the respondent (carrier herein) in the appeal file.

DECISION

Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The issue of IR hinged upon the issue of the extent of injury as the parties stipulated that the claimant's IR including the cervical spine bulges and herniated disc would be 19% and without the cervical spine bulges and herniated disc would be 14%.

We have held that the question of the extent of an injury is a question of fact for the hearing officer. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

In the present case, there was simply conflicting evidence, and it was the province of the hearing officer to resolve these conflicts. While there was certainly conflicting medical evidence, applying the above standard of review, we find that the hearing officer's decision was sufficiently supported by the evidence in the record.

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **(a self-insured governmental entity)** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
(ADDRESS)
(CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).**

Gary L. Kilgore
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Judy L. S. Barnes
Appeals Judge

Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge