

APPEAL NO. 031064  
FILED JUNE 11, 2003

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on April 4, 2003. With respect to the issues before him, the hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury on \_\_\_\_\_, and that she did not have disability. In her appeal, the claimant argues that the hearing officer's injury and disability determinations are against the great weight of the evidence. In its response to the claimant's appeal, the respondent (carrier) urges affirmance.

DECISION

Affirmed.

The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury on \_\_\_\_\_. The claimant had the burden of proof on that issue. Johnson v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 351 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ). The injury issue presented a question of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence and of its weight and credibility. Section 410.165(a). The hearing officer resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and decides what facts the evidence has established. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision we will reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986).

The hearing officer determined that the credible evidence did not establish that the claimant sustained a compensable injury. He simply was not persuaded that the claimant sustained her burden of proof on the injury issue. The hearing officer was acting within his province as the fact finder in so finding. Nothing in our review of the record demonstrates that the challenged determination is so against the great weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust; therefore, no sound basis exists for us to reverse the injury determination on appeal. Pool, supra; Cain, supra.

The 1989 Act requires the existence of a compensable injury as a prerequisite to a finding of disability. Section 401.011(16). Because we have affirmed the determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury, we likewise affirm the determination that she did not have disability.

The hearing officer's decision and order are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY  
800 BRAZOS  
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.**

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Elaine M. Chaney  
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

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Margaret L. Turner  
Appeals Judge

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Edward Vilano  
Appeals Judge