

APPEAL NO. 030925
FILED MAY 27, 2003

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on February 26, 2003. The record closed on March 14, 2003. The hearing officer determined that the appellant's (claimant) compensable injury of _____, does not extend to or include herniated discs at the C5-6 and C6-7 intervertebral levels of the claimant's cervical spine and that the claimant is entitled to supplemental income benefits (SIBs) for the first, second, and third quarters. The claimant appeals the extent-of-injury determination on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. The respondent (self-insured) responds, urging affirmance. The determinations that the claimant is entitled to first, second, and third quarter SIBs were not appealed and have become final. Section 410.169.

DECISION

Affirmed.

Extent of injury is a question of fact. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder, and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence, we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). This is so, even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Applying this standard of review, we are satisfied that the evidence in this case sufficiently supports the hearing officer's determination that the compensable injury sustained by the claimant does not extend to or include herniated discs at the C5-6 and C6-7 intervertebral levels of the claimant's cervical spine.

We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **(a certified self-insured)** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**C T CORPORATION SYSTEM
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.**

Michael B. McShane
Appeals Panel
Manager/Judge

CONCUR:

Elaine M. Chaney
Appeals Judge

Veronica Lopez
Appeals Judge