

APPEAL NO. 022972
FILED JANUARY 6, 2003

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on October 31, 2002. The hearing officer determined that the appellant's (claimant herein) compensable injury of _____, does not extend to include an injury to her right elbow, to her right shoulder, or to her right cervical spine. The hearing officer also determined that the claimant did not have disability from May 6, 2002, to the date of the CCH. The claimant appeals, contending that these determinations were contrary to the evidence. The respondent (carrier herein) replies that the hearing officer's determinations were supported by the evidence.

DECISION

Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The question of the extent of injury is a question of fact. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Company v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying this standard, we find sufficient evidence to support the factual findings of the hearing officer. This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Disability is a question of fact to be determined by the hearing officer. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93560, decided August 19, 1993. Also the claimant had the burden of proof to establish disability. Applying our standard of review discussed above, we do not find the hearing officer erred by finding the claimant failed to meet her burden of proof to establish disability from May 6, 2002, through the date of the CCH.

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING, PENNSYLVANIA** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is:

**C T CORPORATION
350 N. ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.**

Gary L. Kilgore
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Chris Cowan
Appeals Judge

Thomas A. Knapp
Appeals Judge