

APPEAL NO. 021850  
FILED SEPTEMBER 10, 2002

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on July 2, 2002. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by deciding that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease; that the date of injury is \_\_\_\_\_; that the claimant had disability from April 18, 2001, through the date of the CCH; and that the carrier is not relieved of liability. The appellant (carrier) appeals, arguing that the determinations of the hearing officer are against the great weight of the credible evidence. The appeals file does not contain a response from the claimant.

DECISION

Affirmed.

The claimant claimed that he sustained a repetitive trauma injury from performing his work activities for the employer. The claimant had the burden to prove that he sustained a repetitive trauma injury as defined by Section 401.011(36), that he timely notified the employer of his injury under Section 409.001(a), and that he had disability as defined by Section 401.011(16). Conflicting evidence was presented on the disputed issues. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a). As the finder of fact, the hearing officer resolves the conflicts in the evidence and determines what facts have been established. The hearing officer's determinations are supported by the claimant's testimony and by the reports of the treating doctor. We conclude that the hearing officer's decision is supported by sufficient evidence and that it is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986).

Section 408.007 provides that the date of injury for an occupational disease is the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the disease may be related to the employment. The hearing officer resolved the conflicts in the evidence by determining that the date of injury was \_\_\_\_\_. The hearing officer's determination on this issue is supported by sufficient evidence and is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain, *supra*.

We affirm the hearing officer's decision and order.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY  
800 BRAZOS  
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.**

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Margaret L. Turner  
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

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Thomas A. Knapp  
Appeals Judge

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Michael B. McShane  
Appeals Judge