APPEAL NO. 020988
FILED MAY 28, 2002

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on March 21, 2002. In a case involving two alleged dates of injury, and two respondents (carriers), the hearing officer held that the appellant's (claimant) _____, injury did not extend to carpal tunnel syndrome, cervical degenerative disc disease, dorsal root and lumbosacral plexus, or brachial neuritis/radiculitis. The hearing officer further held that the claimant did not sustain a new compensable injury on _____, and therefore had no disability from that injury.

The claimant has appealed the determination as to her second claimed injury, arguing that she was, in fact, hurt at work as she stated. The carrier for the _____ injury responds by noting that there is no appeal of findings relating to the extent of its injury. The carrier for the alleged _____, injury responds that the decision should be affirmed.

DECISION

We affirm.

We incorporate by reference the hearing officer's recitation of the facts. The hearing officer has not erred by finding that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury on _____, or have disability therefrom. Essentially, the claimant quarrels with the manner in which the hearing officer gave weight and credibility to the evidence. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance, materiality, weight, and credibility of the evidence presented at the hearing. Section 410.165(a). The decision should not be set aside because different inferences and conclusions may be drawn upon review, even when the record contains evidence that would lend itself to different inferences. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Volentine, 867 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ).

In considering all the evidence in the record, we cannot agree that the findings of the hearing officer are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong and unjust. In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951). We therefore affirm the decision and order.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier for the _____, date of injury is **AMERICAN PROTECTION INSURANCE COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier for the _____, date of injury is **PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

ROBIN MOUNTAIN
ACE USA
6600 E. CAMPUS CIRCLE DRIVE, SUITE 200
IRVING, TEXAS 75063.

_____
Susan M. Kelley
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

_____
Thomas A. Knapp
Appeals Judge

_____
Roy L. Warren
Appeals Judge