APPEAL NO. 013126 FILED JANUARY 28, 2002

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on November 14, 2001. The hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) sustained a compensable injury to his left knee in the form of a contusion on ______, and that the claimant did not have disability from the compensable injury. The claimant appealed, arguing that the hearing officer erred in determining disability and nature of the injury, and that the hearing officer's determinations are against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence to be manifestly wrong. The respondent (carrier) filed a response urging affirmance.

DECISION

We affirm the hearing officer's decision.

The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance, materiality, weight, and credibility of the evidence presented at the hearing. Section 410.165(a). The decision should not be set aside because different inferences and conclusions may be drawn upon review, even when the record contains evidence that would lend itself to different inferences. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Volentine, 867 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ). In this case, the hearing officer could consider the mechanism of injury and the condition, a meniscus tear, that was ultimately diagnosed as being inconsistent with this mechanism. While the hearing officer believes that the claimant was injured, it is clear that she believed the injury to be fairly minor and not the condition causing his inability to work.

In considering all the evidence in the record, we cannot agree that the findings of the hearing officer are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong and unjust. In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951). We affirm the decision and order.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **THE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY 800 BRAZOS SUITE 750 COMMODORE 1 AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.

	Susan M. Kelley Appeals Judge
CONCUR:	
Chris Cowan	
Appeals Judge	
Robert W. Potts	
Appeals Judge	