APPEAL NO. 013081
FILED JANUARY 31, 2002

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on November 6, 2001. The hearing officer determined that the appellant's (claimant) compensable injury of _____, extended to include reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD) (also known as complex regional pain syndrome) in her right knee. The hearing officer also noted that the preponderance of the evidence indicated that the claimant had not injured her neck, lower back, upper extremities, or left leg when she fell on _____, and RSD did not extend to any other body part than the claimant's right knee.

The claimant appealed, arguing that the hearing officer erred in determining the extent of the claimant's injury, which is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, especially the medical evidence. The respondent (carrier) has responded that the decision is supported by the record and that the medical evidence is in favor of the decision.

DECISION

We affirm the hearing officer's decision.

The claimant's original injury involved falling on her right knee, for which she had surgery. Plainly, the evidence was in conflict as to what more was involved or has developed from this injury. There were doctor's records asserting the presence of RSD, and medical opinions attributing the claimant's symptoms to somatization. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance, materiality, weight, and credibility of the evidence presented at the hearing. Section 410.165(a). The decision should not be set aside because different inferences and conclusions may be drawn upon review, even when the record contains evidence that would lend itself to different inferences. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Volentine, 867 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ).

In considering all the evidence in the record, we cannot agree that the findings of the hearing officer are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong and unjust. In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951). We therefore affirm the decision and order.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **CONNECTICUT INDEMNITY COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

CORPORATION SERVICES COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.

_____
Susan M. Kelley
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

_____
Judy L. S. Barnes
Appeals Judge

_____
Edward Vilano
Appeals Judge