

APPEAL NO. 010950
FILED JUNE 6, 2001

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on April 13, 2001. With respect to the issue before him, the hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) is not entitled to supplemental income benefits (SIBs) for the first quarter. On appeal, the claimant expresses disagreement with this determination. The respondent (carrier) urges affirmance.

DECISION

Affirmed.

Section 408.142(a) outlines the requirements for SIBs eligibility as follows:

An employee is entitled to [SIBs] if on the expiration of the impairment income benefits [IIBs] period computed under Section 408.121(a)(1) the employee:

- (1) has an impairment rating of 15 percent or more as determined by this subtitle from the compensable injury;
- (2) has not returned to work or has returned to work earning less than 80 percent of the employee's average weekly wage as a direct result of the employee's impairment;
- (3) has not elected to commute a portion of the [IIBs] under Section 408.128; and
- (4) has attempted in good faith to obtain employment commensurate with the employee's ability to work.

The hearing officer found that the claimant failed to make a good faith effort to seek employment during the qualifying period for the first compensable quarter. We have previously held that the question of whether the claimant made a good faith job search is a question of fact. *Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 94150*, decided March 22, 1994; *Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 94533*, decided June 14, 1994. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. *Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey*, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. *Taylor v. Lewis*, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); *Aetna*

Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust and we do not find it to be so in this case. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). We have on numerous occasions held that the Appeals Panel should not set aside the decision of a hearing officer because the hearing officer may have drawn inferences and conclusions different than those the Appeals Panel deems most reasonable, even though the record contains evidence of inconsistent inferences. Garza, supra; Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93334, decided June 14, 1993; Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93053, decided March 1, 1993; Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92539, decided November 25, 1992.

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

Gary L. Kilgore
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Thomas A. Knapp
Appeals Judge

Michael B. McShane
Appeals Judge