

## APPEAL NO. 000513

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers= Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. ' 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on February 17, 2000. The hearing determined that the appellant's (claimant) compensable injury of \_\_\_\_\_, did not include a compensable injury to the muscles and tendons and their attachments or soft tissues in the hip region, called enthesopathy. The claimant appeals, arguing that the evidence, including evidence from her treating doctor, established her compensable injury included an injury to her hip. The respondent (self-insured) replies that the evidence sufficiently supported the decision of the hearing officer.

### DECISION

Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The parties stipulated that the claimant suffered a compensable right leg injury on \_\_\_\_\_. The claimant testified this injury took place when she slipped on a waxed floor. The claimant testified that she injured her right side including her right leg and hip. Dr. W, the claimant's treating doctor, related the claimant's right hip problems to her compensable injury. Dr. P, the self-insured's medical examination order doctor, stated that in his opinion the claimant's right hip symptoms were not related to her compensable injury. Dr. L, the designated doctor, does not discuss the claimant's right hip in her report.

The question of whether an injury occurred is one of fact. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93854, decided November 9, 1993; Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93449, decided July 21, 1993. This is also true of the extent of an injury. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).

A finding of injury may be based upon the testimony of the claimant alone. Houston Independent School District v. Harrison, 744 S.W.2d 298, 299 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ). However, as an interested party, the claimant's testimony only raises an issue of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. Escamilla v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 499 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ). In the present case, the hearing officer found no injury to the claimant's right hip contrary to the testimony of the claimant and medical evidence. There was conflicting medical evidence as to whether the claimant's injury included an injury to her right hip. Claimant had the burden to prove she was injured in the course and scope of her employment. Reed v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 535 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). It was the province of the hearing officer to resolve the conflicting medical evidence. We cannot say that the hearing officer was incorrect as a matter of law in finding that the claimant failed to meet this burden. This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

Gary L. Kilgore  
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Joe Sebesta  
Appeals Judge

Thomas A. Knapp  
Appeals Judge